NN42, June 2009
A Safari Towards Aid Effectiveness?
Politics and Policy in Education: Aligning and Harmonising with what Country Priorities?
By David Pedley DFID Ghana and Don Taylor ex-DFID Ghana (now DFID Malawi)
Emails: D-Pedley@dfid.gov.uk and don-taylor@dfid.gov.ukKeywords
Ghana; EFA; harmonisation; priorities
Summary
In Ghana?s education sector, the extent to which donors have been content with government policies has varied over the past decade or so. While donor and government priorities were more aligned in the mid-1980s to the end of the 1990s, since 2002 there has been divergence. This article argues that today it is not so easy for governments to pursue policies which provide the level of resources envisaged in EFA. At the same time, donors are also operating in a world where it is more difficult to influence policies.
Much of the aid provided to the education sector in Ghana comes as sector budget support or general budget support (termed Multi-Donor Budget Support in Ghana, or MDBS). For donors to provide budget support they need to be generally content with the direction of policy and implementation; for budget support only works in an atmosphere of trust and a general agreement on priorities. It depends on the ability to maintain relationships even in the light of disagreements, and confidence that progress is being made in strengthening government systems to plan, spend and account for budget support disbursements.
In the education sector in Ghana, the extent to which donors are content with government policies has varied over time, in the past decade or so. When the New Patriotic Party (NPP) came to power after the 2000 elections, it signed up to the Education For All (EFA) agenda and wrote an Education Strategic Plan (ESP), 2003 ? 2015, with a strong emphasis on expanding basic education, specifically attainment by 2015 of the six EFA goals and the two MDGs relating to education. It was in line with the main donors? approach to education and formed the basis for sector support programmes of DFID, JICA, USAID, Unicef and World Bank ? the ?Big Five?. It also formed the basis for Ghana?s bid for additional resources under the EFA Fast Track Initiative (FTI).
But soon after taking office in 2001, President Kufuor also put in place a parallel process of policy-making in the form of the President?s Committee on the Review of the Education Reforms. The report of this committee in 2002 resulted in a White Paper in 2004 which formed the basis for new reforms, eventually introduced in 2007. Donors were concerned that these were not consistent with the ESP, and expressed these concerns to the Ministry of Education in March 2005 (Taylor, 2005). Most of the key donors were concerned that Ghana was moving away from the FTI ?indicative guideline? that 50% of the education budget should be devoted to primary education. Primary education?s share of the budget was roughly at this level in the mid-1990s (Kosack, 2007), but had fallen to 40% in 2003 and fell to 28% in 2006, before recovering to 35% in 2007 after consistent donor pressure to reverse this declining trend, particularly from DFID. Despite the trend, donors continued to provide support through general and sector budget support, and with discrete projects.
This raises various questions, particularly relating to accountability and conditionality. How can a host government be held accountable for delivering on its international commitments to the MDGs and EFA goals? Who decides, and how, whether a national EFA plan is ?credible? or not? Should donors still align their support with country policies and priorities that do not seem likely to achieve the globally agreed goals? Or should they impose more conditions in a new attempt to leverage change? Should donors continue to shift the balance in favour of budget support operations? Or should they pursue a new projectised approach which gives them greater control over how their money is used? If donors do not trust government systems or share their priorities, why not provide more support through civil society and the private sector?
Donors re-entered the education sector in Ghana in a big way in support of the 1987 reforms of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC). Their finance was urgently needed, as educational expenditure had declined from 6.4% of GDP in 1976 to just 1.5% in 1983 (World Bank, 2004, p.7). They liked the focus of reform, on primary education. They provided both funding and intellectual capital, in the form of policy advice and technical expertise. Donor finance was aligned to government policy.
Today, it is not so easy for governments, in Ghana or elsewhere, to pursue policies and mobilise the level of resources required to achieve the six EFA goals. There are a number of factors in Ghana which have led to them being in this position.
The first is the strong influence of the economic and political elite on both education policy and the allocation of resources. Elite occupations are increasingly represented in the executive (Luckham et al, 2004, pp.37-38). They are more able to influence education policy and to place demands on the education system, in their own interests, rather than those of the poor. There was very broad representation of elite groups on the 2002 President?s Committee.
Secondly, there is a tendency of elite families to send their children to private primary schools to strengthen their chances of securing a place in publicly-funded secondary schools and tertiary education. By sending their children to private schools (and increasingly to private tertiary institutions) and making demands for more resources to be devoted to secondary and tertiary education, elite families can insulate themselves from many of the problems of the education, training and employment experienced by the majority of Ghanaians. This is contributing towards the social structure of Ghana becoming ?ossified?, with upward social mobility becoming more difficult to achieve (Addae-Mensah, 2000).
Thirdly, numbers in tertiary education have increased greatly since the late 1980s, partly reflecting the success in increasing primary and secondary school enrolment. Initially, the increase in numbers in tertiary education, from 10,000 in 1990 to almost 100,000 in 2004 (Adu & Orivel, 2006, p.6) was secured at a decreasing real cost per student (Kosack, 2007, p.21). Since then tertiary enrolments have increased further, reaching 140,000 in 2006/07 (MoESS 2008, p.52), but expenditure per tertiary student has stabilised. Tertiary education?s share of total public education expenditure increased from 14% in 2003 to 23% in 2007 (MoESS 2008, p.115).
In these circumstances, introducing a policy that favours the poor requires a strong drive and ability to go against the grain. Nkrumah, for instance, broke away from the leaders who had brought him back to Ghana, formed his own party and exhorted its members to traverse the country to secure the allegiance of the common man and woman. Amongst his government?s policies was a strong drive to increase resources devoted to primary education. The 1987 reforms were also brought in by a leader and a government with a strong ideology in favour of the poor. Importantly, as was increasingly the case with Nkrumah?s government, it could force through its policies as it ruled unopposed. Today, perhaps, elite families have a stronger grip on power. So, whilst they can be officially committed to EFA, the forces identified above limit the willingness and ability of a government to orientate priorities and resources towards primary education. This was reflected in the 2008 election manifestos of both main parties, which hardly mentioned primary education.
Donors are also operating in a context where it is more difficult to influence policy and resource allocations. Donor finance is now much less needed in Ghana than in the past, with only 10% of total public expenditure on education in 2007 coming from external donor sources (including MDBS). Donors' inputs in the form of ideas and advice are also less needed. Thus, whilst donor-financed studies and papers served as an input into the 1987 reforms, their influence waned in the 1990s, and donors were entirely excluded from the 2002 President?s Committee and ensuing reform agenda.
So, why do donors stay engaged? Firstly, whilst they have their concerns, they are still generally supportive of the evident progress in education and in public sector reform in Ghana. Secondly, they are still able to discuss policies within the education sector group and in MDBS reviews, even if they sometimes have to ?agree to disagree?. Finally, donor influence ebbs and flows. The new NDC government has come to power (in January 2009) at a time when there is evidence ? in the 2008 Education Sector Performance Report (MoESS, 2008), and elsewhere ? that the 2007 reforms are unaffordable and unsustainable, as donors were arguing in 2004 and 2005. It has also come to power during a major world economic downturn. These factors may mean that the new government will have to spend some time re-thinking, re-prioritising, and making policy trade-offs. Because donors have maintained a good relationship with the government through the years, they are in a strong position to contribute to this exercise. Their staff and consultants may once again be appreciated for their technical expertise and international experience, and the donor agencies valued as financiers of studies and evaluations, as well as of programmes and budgets.
References
Addae-Mensah, I., (2000) ?Education in Ghana: a tool for social mobility or social stratification??, (J.B. Danquah memorial lecture, Accra, GAAS, 2000).
Adu, K. & Orivel, F., (2006) ?Tertiary education funding strategy in Ghana?, (Accra, mimeo, January 2006).
Kosack, S., (2007) "Realizing Education For All: Defining and Using the Political Will to Invest in Primary Education," paper prepared for the World Congress of Comparative Education Societies conference, Sarajevo, September 30, 2007.
Luckham, R with Gyimah-Boadi, E, Ahadzie, W, Boateng, N, (2004) Case Study: "The Middle Classes and their role in National Development" (Accra, DFID, 2004).
Ministry of Education, Science and Sports (2008) ?Education Sector Performance Report, 2008?, (Accra, MoESS, July 2008).
Taylor, D.C., (2005) ?International Development Partners? joint response to proposed reforms in the education system in Ghana?, (Accra, DFID, 2005).
World Bank, (2004) "Books, Buildings, and Learning Outcomes: an Impact Evaluation of World Bank Support to Basic Education in Ghana", (Washington, DC, World Bank).
The views expressed are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of DFID.
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